Sample student reflection
by Jill Caplan
SCOL 270
Andre LeBlanc
Reflection 3 – Chalmers
In chapters seven and eight, Chalmers explores several issues with falsification, and introduces a new methodology. Chalmers explains how inaccuracies can always be logically deduced, while laws cannot be deduced, since they involve generalization. According to Popper, you need but one observation that conflicts with its claims to disprove a theory. If I say that all students in the science college are overachievers but find one student who is happy to glide by on the bare minimum, my claim has been falsified. But Popper says that falsifications by nature should be dependent on a theory and fallible, meaning they have the potential to fail. So, an observation that clashes with a claim could mean that the claim is false, or the theory is false. Moreover, the evidence may be false! How are we to deduce which of these three elements is truly false? Chalmers simply says, we cannot tell, and by that token, falsifications cannot be born of observations.
The level of complexity in any given theory is amplified during scientific experiment. The theory is based on multiple claims, several assumptions, and involves many steps including set-up. Any number of these things could be inaccurate or inadequate. The falsificationist theory does not allow us to determine which element of the scientific experiment is false, it simply indicates that something is wrong. This point of contention was raised by Duhem, after whom it is commonly attributed. A common problem in science is the scientist’s unwavering dedication to a theory. When an observation seems to prove the theory false, the scientist proposes an assumption to satisfy the problem. In this way, the theory can never be falsified. However, it has proved useful that past theories were not abandoned based on a single observable contradiction, as they advanced science. Some of these examples are Newton’s gravitational theory, Bohr’s theory of the atom, the kinetic theory of gasses, and the Copernican revolution. One solution to this dilemma is to allow for the modification of theories in the face of conflicting evidence. In psychology, I recently learned of Baddeley’s model of working memory, which he modified twice to make up for inadequacies in his initial model.
In Chapter 8, Chalmers explores a better approach to scientific discovery, in which theories are regarded as structures. Using this method, the preciseness and meaning of the theory are most important. Thomas Kuhn, who proposed this theory, used the history of science to back it. He describes the advancement of science as circular, looping from a new normal, to a crisis, and back to a new normal. I find this similar to the scientific method we follow today, where the results will determine whether the hypothesis is reformulated or temporarily accepted. Kuhn uses paradigms, which describe the basic concepts and experimental practices of any scientific discipline in a standardized way. For example, visual habituation is a paradigm in psychology, which can be used for babies and animals since neither can provide verbal feedback.
If we can maintain objective paradigms, and analyze the relationship between them, the essence of science is preserved.
If paradigm shifts account for the flow of scientific discovery over time, how can we explain theories that are so ahead of their time that they don’t even compare to their predecessor’s theory, such as those of Nikola Tesla?
