Explain conflict and cooperation by differing mechanisms. Understanding how these mechanisms operate is crucial when discussing international relations, and can be best explained by using a historic event to explore both more deeply.

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Respond to the below discussion post below.

Post #1: “Perspective

An oft cited critique of Neo-realism (at least among International Relations theory positivists) is that the focus is too narrowly centered on ongoing power struggles as the primary relationship between states, and that the only actors on the world stage that play into the ebb and flow of influence are unitary state actors. Neo-liberalism challenges this by widening the circle of study to include both domestic and international factors that play into how relationships evolve—economic liberalism focuses on trade as a fulcrum upon which peace operates, institutional liberalism takes into account how transnational organizations create stability, sociological liberalism accepts human factors and cultural exchange as critical inflection points, and republican liberalism seeks to explain global relationships by exploring the stabilizing effects of democracy (Shimko 1992). Naturally, neither of these theories is more correct than the other, rather, they both explain conflict and cooperation by differing mechanisms. Understanding how these mechanisms operate is crucial when discussing international relations, and can be best explained by using a historic event to explore both more deeply.

World War I

World War I was called (perhaps naively) “The Great War”, as many at the time considered such widescale and deadly warfare to surely be the war to end all wars. The scale of destruction was so severe and unpredictable that classical philosophical perspectives were unable to keep up with the shifting tides of power politics—pragmatists like John Dewey (not of the decimal system fame, mind you) adopted stances closer to neorealism in the early stages of war to explain how warfare on such a wide scale could induce a more inherently stable political system, only to backtrack as the war dragged on to account for the calamity that the war caused (Howlett 2017, 67-68). Understanding how differing perspectives can evolve as conflict continues is a fickle task; Ole Holsti rightly compared this concept to viewing events through a pair of colored sunglasses, where certain lens colors only allow for the sight of specific events, and thus differing events may seem more central or critical than others (Snyder 2004). This “selective” assessment of a given conflict leads to differing historical accounts of World War I, both in perspectives of causality and results, both downstream and immediate, and can be confusing when trying to wrap one’s head around the reality of such an ugly stain on the history of humanity.

Neorealism perspective

As discussed previously, the simplified version of the neorealist perspective of IR theory is centered on power and security as the veritable “poker chips” with which countries barter on the international stage. The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand provided the impetus for the Austrian empire to invade Serbia, a neighboring nation whose internal political instability (which was just a part of the greater instability of the Balkans at the time) threated the security of Austria. The ruling Habsburgs, wary of the potential destabilization that Serbian nationalism posed to an already declining historic empire, were quick to pounce on the opportunity to tender nearly impossible-to-accept conditions to Serbia to avoid conflict, which predictably led to hostilities, and eventually, the collapse of civility among the great powers in Europe, necessitating war (Pfaltzgraff 2019). This may seem like a harsh decision that led to a poor outcome, but in the neorealist perspective it was justified. Unitary actors (participatory nations), acting under an overarching anarchic system, acted in predictable ways to consolidate power and ensure internal security in response to a series of security dilemmas (Snyder & Liber 2008). This direct, simplified explanation for such a massive event leaves little wiggle room for nuance, however, which is where neoliberalism comes in.

Neoliberalism perspective

Neoliberalism is not a direct counter to neorealist thinking, but rather a compliment to it in many ways. Neoliberalism seeks to explain conflict and relationships in broader, fuller context than many classical perspectives, and does so by identifying specific types of relationships that influence widescale events in history. In this perspective, WWI was not simply a struggle between state actors for power and security. The Austro-Hungarian empire, for all of its’ political capital and industrial prowess, still lagged behind much of the rest of rapidly developing Europe and the dawn of the 20th century. This perceived weakening of empirical might was coupled with an ever-evolving cultural landscape, which saw expanding borders of ethnicities and cultures, leading to friction between various groups across Europe. These relationships were consolidated over time (and through conflict) and took on the form of formalized alliances—the Serbians, who shared a common Slavic background, cozied up to the Russians (who were economically and militarily tied to the French and British), while the Austrians made concrete relationships with Germany, Bulgaria, and the Ottoman Empire (Williamson 1988). From the neoliberalist perspective, the lack of over-arching international institutions, economic parity (as it pertains to free-trade, somewhat paradoxically), and free flow of cultural exchanges provided the break from which war erupted. As such, in this perspective, the outbreak of war was not a failure of liberal policies, but rather a conflict between less interdependent states (Austria vs. Serbia) that embroiled more interdependent states and resulted in a global catastrophe (Gartzke & Lupu 2012, 114-117).

Gartzke, Erik, and Yonatan Lupu. (2012). “Trading on Preconceptions: Why World War I Was Not a Failure of Economic Interdependence.” International Security 36, no. 4: 115–50. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41428122.

Howlett, Charles F., and Audrey Cohan. (2017). “World War I and a Pragmatist’s Dilemma.” Peace Research 49, no. 1: 67–95. http://www.jstor.org/stable/26382713.

Pfaltzgraff, Robert L. (2019). “World War I and IR Theory.” The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 43, no. 1 : 5–18. http://www.jstor.org/stable/45289824.

Shimko, Keith L. (1992). “Realism, Neorealism, and American Liberalism.” The Review of Politics 54, no. 2 : 281–301. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1407486.

Snyder, Jack. (2004). “One World, Rival Theories.” Foreign Policy, no. 145: 53–62. https://doi.org/10.2307/4152944.

Snyder, Jack, and Keir A. Lieber. (2008). “Defensive Realism and the ‘New’ History of World War I.” International Security 33, no. 1: 174–94. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40207106.

Williamson, Samuel R. (1988). “The Origins of World War I.” The Journal of Interdisciplinary Histocgory 18, no. 4: 795–818. https://doi.org/10.2307/204825.”